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Symposium on Sentencing Rhetoric:
Competing Narratives in the Post-
Booker Era
October 22, 2005
David M. Zlotnick*
FOREWORD
On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court held that the
United States Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional as
mandatory rules, unsettling a sentencing regime that had been in
place since 1987.1 While the first order of business for the
criminal justice system has been to implement the Court-created
advisory Guidelines regime, almost immediately the debate began
* Associate Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law,
J.D. Harvard Law School, 1986. Many are due thanks for making this
volume and the symposium happen. First and foremost, however, is Dean
David Logan who asked me to undertake the project, and as importantly,
provided the funding. Chelsie Horne, C.M.P. ran a flawless event and the
editors of the law review handled the authors with care. I also deeply
appreciate the willingness of my sentencing comrades in academia, the
bench, government, private practice, and the public interest community for
taking time from their busy lives to participate in this event. With regard to
my substantive contributions to the volume and the symposium panels, the
dedicated research and editing efforts of Christine List are much appreciated.
1. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005).
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over whether and how to replace the awkward and ill-defined
sentencing process created by Booker's remedial majority opinion. 2
Given the import of the decision, there have already been
numerous conferences about Booker and its aftermath. Rather
than repeat these efforts, this symposium attempted to use the
lens of rhetorical analysis and narrative scholarship to offer a
different perspective on the future of sentencing policy in the post-
Booker era.
Before commenting on the symposium and the articles within,
a brief introduction to the concept of sentencing rhetoric seems
appropriate. I see sentencing rhetoric as a broad umbrella for the
discourse within the criminal justice system and the legislative
process about how punishment is determined and imposed for
criminal offenses. In the courtroom, sentencing rhetoric
encompasses the competing narratives of defendants, defense
lawyers, prosecutors, victims, and probation officers, as well as the
comments of the judge when pronouncing sentence. At the macro-
level, these individual stories are spun and aggregated with the
explicit intent of influencing policy decisions, as well as refracted
by federalism issues and by the power struggle between the
political parties and among the judiciary, executive and legislative
branches.
Before Booker there was little expectation of any major shift
in the dominant sentencing paradigm and hence sentencing
rhetoric had grown formulaic and stifled at all levels of discourse.
Sentencings in the federal system had become mind-numbing
exercises in the arcanity of the Guidelines in which the defendant,
his crime, and any obvious connection to the purposes of criminal
sanctions had long disappeared. Legislative debate was comprised
of not much more than a rear-guard action against continued
conservative initiatives to eliminate the last vestiges of judicial
discretion. However, with mandatory guidelines now eliminated
as an option, all interested parties recognize the post-Booker world
as a moment of both significant opportunity and substantial risks.
2. I say awkward and ill-defined because, under Booker, a district court
judge must still compute the Guidelines range and then superimpose the
additional consideration of § 3553(a) on to their sentencing decision, yet
without clear instructions from the Court about how to weigh the Guidelines
against the statutory factors (other than the overarching standard of
"reasonableness." Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 767.
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In response, politicians and prosecutors, courts and
commentators, attorneys and activists have advanced with
renewed vigor, a wealth of conflicting narratives, some intended to
influence individual sentences, and others crafted to shape the
future of sentencing policy.
For example, although in Booker the Supreme Court used the
formalism of constitutional discourse to invalidate the Sentencing
Guidelines, suspicious legislators saw the culmination of a long-
simmering rebellion by the judiciary against congressional limits
on sentencing discretion.3 Thus, legislators have amplified their
longstanding rhetoric that judges are the sole obstacle to a
uniform and appropriately punitive sentencing regime. 4 Federal
prosecutors have chimed in with their theme that Booker has
reduced the leverage necessary to induce cooperation from
defendants and thereby endangered their ability to prosecute
violent and secretive criminal organizations.5
3. Rep. Thomas Feeney (R-FL) stated the decision was an "egregious
overreach into Congress's constitutional power.., that place[ed]
extraordinary power to sentence a person solely in the hands of a single
federal judge - who is accountable to no one [and therefore] flies in the face of
the clear will of Congress." Press Release, United States House of
Representatives, Feeney Comments on Supreme Court Sentencing Ruling.
(Jan. 12, 2005) (available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/fl24-
feeney/SupremeCourtOpinion.html); See also Noelle Tsiqounis Valentine, An
Exploration of the Feeney Amendment: The Legislation that Prompted the
Supreme Court to Undo Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform, 55 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 619, 621 (2005) (discussing the Feeney Amendment's substantial limits
on judicial discretion and its influence on the Court's decision in Booker).
4. "Mandatory minimum penalties are effective for ensuring consistency
in sentencing. Since the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Booker, judges now have virtually unlimited discretion to ignore the Federal
sentencing guidelines and impose whatever sentence they like, all to the
detriment of public safety and fairness and sentencing through consistent
and clear punishment schemes. Judges are now completely unaccountable."
151 CONG. REC. H10090-02, H10100 (Nov. 9, 2005) (statement of Rep. James
Sensenbrenner). See also Federal Sentencing After Booker, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (Feb. 10, 2005) (written testimony of
Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Attorney General) (describing sentences
administered below the applicable guideline range based on factors
previously prohibited from consideration).
5. See, e.g., id. at 16 ("This will have grave effects on the Department's
ability to prosecute a wide variety of crimes... such as drug trafficking,
gangs, corporate fraud and terrorism offenses."); Bloomberg, U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Made Advisory by Court, THE NOVEMBER COALITION (Jan. 12,
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At the opposite end, defense attorneys are using the space
created by Booker to resuscitate traditional sentencing allocution,
calling with renewed vigor for compassion for individual
defendants and telling stories of addictions and broken childhoods,
and of remorse and rehabilitation.6  Academic discourse
constitutes yet another layer, which typically has invoked Booker
to widen the lens, arguing that the Court-created turmoil creates
momentum for a fundamental reconsideration of sentencing
policy. 7 Their reports and articles urge Congress to go back to the
drawing board, claiming that the regime of the last twenty-five
years has failed to achieve the goals of sentencing reform, pointing
to the increasing racial disparity in the nation's prisons, a
seemingly irreversible upward ratcheting of sentences, and other
deep flaws in the Sentencing Guidelines.
To reflect on the varied rhetorical reactions to Booker, this
symposium brought together federal judges, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, congressional staffers, public interest advocates, and
academics. The result was an interesting day of conversation, and
at times, spirited debate. Panelists examined sentencing rhetoric
2005) ("It probably will create additional leverage for defense counsel in
negotiating agreements.") (quoting Minnesota U.S. Attorney Todd Jones).
6. See David L. McColgin, Grid & Bear It, 29 CHAMPION 50, at 51 (Nov.
2005) (discussing the need for defense counsel "to conduct a detailed
investigation of the client's life, covering social, family and medical history as
well as educational and work background" since courts are now permitted to
consider a number of factors which were disallowed under the guidelines).
See also Alan Ellis & James H. Feldman, Jr., Representing White Collar
Clients in a Post-Booker World, 29 CHAMPION 12, at 14 (Sept.-Oct. 2005)
(discussing the need to emphasize rehabilitation and the inadequacy of
imprisonment to serve that purpose).
7. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Our Federal System of Sentencing, 58
STAN. L. REV. 119, 119 (2005) (highlighting the federalism concerns in
sentencing policy that must be reconsidered); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Murder,
Meth, Mammon, and Moral Values: The Political Landscape of American
Sentencing Reform, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 495, 495-96, 515 (2005) (discussing the
moral values which must be considered in forming a new sentencing system).
8. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1315-16 (2005)
(addressing the problems of excessive prosecutorial power, the complexity of
the guideline table, the upward ratcheting of sentences, and the severe
constraint on judicial discretion); William J. Stuntz, The Political
Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARv. L. REV. 780, 839-40 (2005)
(highlighting the four major problems of sentencing: severity, racial disparity,
lack of uniformity, and increasing prosecutorial power).
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at different levels of abstraction and critically examined (and
cross-examined each other on) the influence of partisanship. There
were also important discussions about what has been omitted
from the discourse, especially the silence and denial that has
greeted charges that racial and gender bias are responsible for the
dramatic increases in the incarceration of minorities and women
under the combined mandatory minimum and Guidelines regime.
We also talked a good deal about judicial sentencing rhetoric,
especially about what judges say at sentencings, and debated the
merits of a recent opinion by Eleventh Circuit Judge Gerald
Tjoflat, in which he chastised district court judges for criticizing
the Guidelines from the bench as they pronounced sentence. 9 This
discussion went to the heart of the role of a judge in a democratic
society and how judges could appropriately express their personal
views about the fairness of the laws they have sworn to
implement.
In addition to the presentation of papers, the symposium
utilized smaller breakout sessions to encourage free-flowing
discussion, including one panel dedicated to Rhode Island federal
practice. This panel featured all three active local federal judges,
the U.S. Attorney for the District of Rhode Island and the local
Federal Public Defender. Here, much of the discussion focused on
whether Booker permits judges to sentence below the Guidelines
in crack cocaine cases. One member of the panel, Judge William
Smith (D. RI), is the author of the widely admired Perry10 decision,
which set forth a comprehensive foundation for rejecting the
Guidelines' treatment of crack offenses."
9. United States v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2005)
(Tljoflat, J. concurring). Judge Tjoflat argues that such criticism from the
bench may make defendants (1) less likely to accept punishment and enter
prison in a frame of mind conducive to rehabilitation, and (2) encourage them
"to persist in attacking [their] sentence on direct and collateral review." Id.
In addition, Judge Tjoflat claimed that "[B]y openly disparaging the
defendant's sentence, the judge fosters disrespect for the rule of law." Id. at
1304.
10. 389 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D.R.I. 2005).
11. During this panel, each of the three judges indicated that they
believed that something less than the 100:1 ratio could be appropriate for
crack sentences. However, in light of the First Circuit's reversal of Judge
Torres's 20:1 ratio in United States v. Pho, the future of non-Guideline-based
crack sentencing in Rhode Island District Court seems substantially less
likely. 433 F. 3d 53 (1st Cir. 2006).
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And, of course, the symposium resulted in contributions from
many of the participants to this volume of the Roger Williams Law
Review. The selections begin with Professor Ron Wright's essay,
which provides a framework for understanding the post-Booker
rhetorical world. 12 He first shows that post-Booker sentencing
rhetoric can be understood as existing along a continuum from
incrementalists, who argue that nothing much has changed, to
those with more incendiary claims that Booker has created chaos
and/or a return to the intolerable disparity and lenient sentences
of the past. Second, Professor Wright claims that institutional
allegiance is highly predictive in the post-Booker environment,
with sentencing commissions most reflecting the incremental
approach, and prosecutors and conservative legislators leading the
"parade of horribles" contingent. 13 Third, Professor Wright posits
that each group's rhetorical choices have been consciously
influenced by their views about the possible legislative reaction to
Booker. Judges and sentencing commissioners are most afraid of
awakening the sleeping legislative dragon, which might respond
with even more rigid sentencing policies, whereas conservatives,
outraged over the Court's usurpation of their hard-won
restrictions on sentencing discretion, seek to stir Congressional
action.
Political Science Professor Naomi Murakawa contributes a
provocative article that makes a case for the racialized
development of the Sentencing Guidelines. 14 She traces the
recent conflict between Congress and the courts over sentencing
discretion back to the federal courts' role in the breakdown of Jim
Crow and racial segregation in the mid-20th Century. She argues
that, while explicit claims about the need for racial order have
given way to coded arguments about rising crime rates and the
need for uniformity, conservative criticism of the Supreme Court's
decisions has sounded consistent themes from Brown v. Board of
12. Ronald Wright, Incremental and Incendiary Rhetoric in Sentencing
After Blakely and Booker, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 461 (2006).
13. Wright notes that the rhetoric of judges is more varied given the
different political backgrounds of the bench but that judges, especially the
official organs of the judiciary, are closer to the "wait and see" perspective of
the incrementalists. Id. at 468-69.
14. Naomi Murakawa, The Racial Antecedents to Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: How Congress Judged the Judges from Brown to Booker, 11
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 473 (2006).
2006] SYMPOSIUM ON SENTENCING RHETORIC
Education through Booker. The claims are that federal judges are
liberal, elitist, and out of touch with the needs of local
communities and that they risk the destruction of the social order
by treating minorities with too much leniency. Because of the
Warren Court's reputation for liberalism in areas of black civil
rights, criminal defense, and prisoners' rights, these claims
continue to resonate with voters whether the issue is education or
crime.
In laying out this political and darker vision, Professor
Murakawa also undermines the narrative of sentencing reform
that holds sway over the legal academic literature, which she calls
the revolution sparked by disrupted ideals.15  In the
legal/scholarly narrative, research from experts and judges was
the major catalyst for the massive shift from the rehabilitative
ideal to punishment and the elimination of sentencing disparities.
Murakawa notes, however, that political science research does not
support this narrative because the motivations for Congressional
action generally involve a far messier and more political process.
She makes a convincing case that, generally, it is pressure from
outside a stable and insular system, such as the indeterminate
sentencing regime that had dominated since the mid-nineteenth
century, that provokes sudden and radical changes like the
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA). Thus, while legal academics prefer
to cite the rational and racial justice reasons Senator Kennedy
invoked for sentencing reform, it was the critical support of
conservative Senators such as McClellan and Thurmond that
resulted in the SRA. In support of her thesis, she provides
examples of chillingly similar rhetoric that these Southern
conservatives used to attack civil rights legislation and the Brown
decision, alongside their more recent critiques of the sentencing
practices of federal judges.
Professor Ian Weinstein's article also offers a historical
perspective. He takes a fresh look at the issue of regional
disparity through the lens of historical narrative. Despite
repeated efforts of Congress and the Commission to enforce
national uniformity, significant regional variations in sentencing
practices remain. 16 Building on the work of historian David
15. Id. at 476-80.
16. See Ian Weinstein, The Historical Roots of Regional Sentencing
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Hackett Fisher, Professor Weinstein suggests that these
entrenched regional sentencing practices reflect powerful folkways
that accompanied different waves of European immigration.
These folkways, he argues, are still embedded in the general and
legal cultures of different regions of the nation, where these
different groups of settlers first put down roots. His recognition of
the continuing resonance of the immigration narrative in
American culture poses a substantial challenge to Congressional
assertions in the SRA and the Feeney Amendment that the
federal criminal justice system can and should encompass a single
set of values and practices. As Professor Weinstein writes, "[t]he
great American experiment in combining diverse groups has
always been characterized by the pull of great unifying moments
and the push of compromises that permit sectional, and other,
differences to coexist in our federal structure." 17 Therefore, he also
argues that Booker can be seen as an effort to re-balance the
power of regional and national visions for our criminal law.'8 Not
only is Professor Weinstein's counter-story to the conservative's
narrative of uniformity compelling, it also has far reaching policy
implications. The persistence of regional folkway values about
crime highlights the role that Congress's federalization of minor
drug and gun offenses has played in generating dissatisfaction at
the local level, and belies conservative claims that they are the
defenders of federalism and states' rights.
Stephanie Weinstein and Arthur Wolfson also contribute a
narrative scholarship article that builds on the work of their
mentors, Professors Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic. 19 After
positing that the generic narrative structure of a criminal case
involves the competing stories of defendant, victim, and
prosecutor, Weinstein and Wolfson explore each of these
narratives in a highly charged case involving a star African-
American high school student convicted of sex offenses involving a
white, female co-student. After considering each of the
participant's stories, Weinstein and Wolfson suggest that judges
Variation, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 495 (2006).
17. Id. at 508.
18. Id. at 509.
19. Stephanie Weinstein & Arthur Wolfson, Toward a Due Process of
Narrative: Before You Lock My Love Away, Please Let Me Testify, 11 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 511 (2006).
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at sentencing should consider aspects of the counterstories of the
defendant and victim that may not have been credited in the all or
nothing context of a trial. Without proposing a formula, they offer
their narrative theory, which they call the due process of
narrative, as a tool by which judges might endeavor to synthesize
and harmonize the competing stories in a criminal case. Their
due process of narrative, with its explicit intent of inclusiveness,
stands in stark contrast to the singularity of the punitive
approach embedded in the Guidelines regime. While these
authors do not suggest that their narrative framework is likely to
be actualized any time soon, their imagination reveals that,
nevertheless, there are theoretical approaches to sentencing that
could transcend the stale dichotomies of rehabilitation-versus-
punishment and discretion-versus-uniformity that have
characterized sentencing discourse for too long.
In addition to these articles, which examine the broadest
narratives of sentencing rhetoric, the symposium also sought to
give equal time to sentencing rhetoric at the individual case and
actor level. Two articles in this volume are dedicated to more
singular perspectives. Judge Lynn Adelman and Jon Deitrich
write about fulfilling Booker's promise. Judge Adelman, one of the
clearest and most courageous judicial voices in the post-Booker
world, does not hide his happiness over the turn of events or
minimize their significance, writing that "[a]fter Booker, judges
need no longer impose sentences that they do not believe in.
Booker restored a meaningful role to judges at sentencing and
enables them to craft sentences appropriate to circumstances of a
case."20 Yet, Judge Adelman is still a typical post-Guidelines
judge. He does not seek the unfettered discretion of an earlier era.
For him, the Guidelines provide an objective marker against
which to measure a sentence, 21 and therefore provide a useful
service.
Judge Adelman also welcomes how Booker has returned
meaningful rhetoric to the courtroom. Instead of unintelligible
language about the applicability of particular Guideline
provisions, Booker directs courts to consider and speak about
20. Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Fulfilling Booker's Promise, 11 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 521, 521 (2006).
21. Id. at 525-28.
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traditional sentencing factors such as the circumstances of the
case, the character of the defendant and the need for the sentence
to reflect the seriousness of the offense and to protect the public.
However, to fulfill Booker's promise, Judge Adelman argues that
litigants must reinvigorate their sentencing rhetoric, and the body
of his article provides a primer and a bevy of possible avenues. 22
For example, Judge Adelman explains that while the Guidelines,
through the criminal history axis, focused attention on only the
bad things about the defendant's character, 23 § 3553(a)'s
instruction to consider the history and characteristics of the
defendant now allow judges to fully consider a person's positive
character traits so that courts may treat defendants as whole
people. 24 Judge Adelman concludes with an admonition that we
should not worship the false idol of uniformity, but rather, focus
on doing justice in individual cases. 25 No turn of phrase could
better capture the core theme of the judiciary in this debate.
Professor Eva Nilsen chose to examine the facts and legal
arguments in the Weldon Angelos case. 26 After much anguish,
Judge Paul Cassell (D. UT) sentenced Angelos, a first-time
offender, to fifty-five years in prison for three small marijuana
deals in which he allegedly possessed (but did not use) a handgun.
While Booker provided Judge Cassell the opportunity to avoid
giving Angelos an even longer sentence, the prosecutor's decision
to charge multiple gun counts that carry consecutive and
mandatory terms left this judge with no ability to go below the
fifty-five years. The fact that Judge Cassell is a well-known
conservative voice, both as a judge and law professor, garnered his
outrage at the severity of this sentence national attention.
Professor Nilsen's contribution is to recognize there are other
avenues for constitutional rhetoric to combat the harsh sentencing
laws of the modem era besides the Sixth Amendment line of cases
22. As part of his structural blueprint, Judge Adelman repeats his
contention from United States v. Ranum that the Guidelines are not entitled
to presumptive weight under Booker and that, in fact, such a position violates
Booker's Sixth Amendment rationale. 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 986-87 (E.D.
Wisc. 2005). See generally Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 20, at 19.
23. Id. at 528.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 535.
26. Eva S. Nilsen, Indecent Standards: The Case of U.S. versus Weldon
Angelos, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 537 (2006).
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that bore fruit in Booker. Using Angelos as a starting point, she
argues for reinvigorated rhetoric of cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. She amasses evidence from both
this case, and more generally, that the tide of public opinion has
turned against extraordinarily long prison sentences for non-
violent crimes. For example, she cites legislation in more than a
dozen states scaling back mandatory minimum sentences, as well
as the amicus brief in Angelos signed by 163 former federal
prosecutors and judges.
As a rhetorical strategy, Nilsen's focus on the Eighth
Amendment's basic concept of cruel and unusual punishment, and
the case law's evocation of evolving standards of decency, has
great promise. Certainly, these rhetorical hooks are more
understandable and appealing than the obscure and seemingly
contradictory holding in Booker, which increased judicial power
under a constitutional provision designed to secure the right to a
jury. Nilsen's article is a reminder to lawyers that strategies that
failed in the past may bear fruit as political and social conditions
change. After all, few scholars before 2000 foresaw Apprendi,
Blakely, and Booker. As Barry Friedman's scholarship makes
clear, our democracy has a rhetorical component that exists
alongside the formal electoral system and separation of powers
structure.27 Thus, policymaking can be understood as a complex
and ongoing conversation among and between the branches of
government and the people. Under this framework, Angelos could
conceivably be the first marker of a new front in the battle over
criminal punishment between the Court and Congress.
Finally, in an effort to provide examples of sentencing rhetoric
in their most protean form, and to provide access to the otherwise
unavailable raw materials, this volume includes transcripts from
post-Booker sentencing before Rhode Island judges Ernest Torres
and Mary Lisi.28
27. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV.
577, 580-81 (1993).
28. Judge Torres's contribution is from the post-Booker resentencing of
former Providence mayor, Buddy Cianci, who was convicted of RICO
conspiracy in a case that fixated the region for months. Ultimately, Judge
Torres decided that the Guideline sentence he originally imposed was also a
reasonable sentence under Booker, holding that none of the § 3553(a) factors
mandated a different sentence. Resentencing Hearing Transcript, United
States v. Cianci, No. 00-83T (D.R.I. 2005), 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 565
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In conclusion, although perhaps many in the sentencing arena
are still largely repeating their lines from the Guidelines era,
there is no question that Booker has at least provided an opening
for new and more creative sentencing rhetoric. If this symposium
has made a positive contribution to that process, it has been by
helping to sensitize the participants, and now readers of these
articles, to the narrative structure of sentencing discourse and to
the rhetorical choices by various actors in the system. Whether
this clarity and insight will move the sleeping dragon to more
rational policy choices when it wakes, only time will tell.
My many thanks again to the symposium participants and
authors, the Roger Williams University Law School and Law
Review editors for their assistance and funding.
(2006). In Judge Lisi's two cases, however, her evaluation of the § 3553(a)
factors resulted in sentences below the Guideline ranges. Specifically, she
was able to consider factors such as the nonviolent nature of the crime, the
defendant's troubled past, and efforts to obtain further education, which
probably would not have been grounds for a downward departure under the
Guidelines. Sentencing Hearing Transcript, United States v. Vasconcelos, No.
04-081ML (D.R.I. 2005), 11 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 579 (2006) (Judge Mary
Lisi presiding); Reconsideration and Correction of Sentence Hearing
Transcript, United States v. Luna, No. 03-111ML (D.R.I. 2005) (Judge Mary
Lisi presiding), 11 ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 589 (2006). Judge Torres's and
Judge Lisi's recent Rhode Island District Court cases thus provide a
microcosm of how Booker has and has not changed sentencing outcomes.
